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WHY I DO LAW REFORM
Lawrence W. Waggoner*
In this Article, Professor Waggoner, newly retired, provides a retrospective on his
career in law reform. He was inspired to write the Article by a number of articles by
law professors explaining why they write. He contrasts law-reform work with
law-review writing, pointing out that the work product of a law-reform reporter is
directed to duly constituted law-making authorities. He notes that before getting
into the law-reform business, he had authored or co-authored law review articles
that advocated reform, but he also notes that those articles did not move the law a
whit. The articles did, however, lead to his selection as reporter, first for the Uni-
form Law Commission and then for the American Law Institute. Only by
becoming a reporter was he able to influence the law. The Article lists a number of
reforms in which he played a part, in a career in law reform that spanned nearly
three decades. The Article closes by addressing the question in the title. He devoted
much of his career to law reform work, he writes, in the hope that the work im-
proved the law. And, he admits, he also did it because he liked doing it.
A number of articles by law professors explaining why they write
inspired me to write this Article explaining why I do law reform.'
By now, it is well known among the law professoriate that most of
what is written by law professors today is written for other law pro-
fessors, not for the legal profession at large. James Boyd White said
that he "[does] not in the main write as professional to professional,
* Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. The author
served as Reporter for the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers, as Director of Research for the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate
Acts, and as Reporter for the 1990 and 2008 revisions of the Uniform Probate Code.
1. Because of my role in the law reform process, it is especially fitting for me to write
this Article for the ACTEC Symposium on "The Uniform Probate Code: Remaking Ameri-
can Succession Law," which was held at my own law school on October 21, 2011.
2. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992); see also WALTER OLSON, ScHooLs FOR MISRULE 39
(2011) (quoting Harold C. Havighurst, Law Reviews and Legal Education, 51 Nw. U. L. REV.
22, 24 (1956) ("Whereas most periodicals are published primarily in order that they may be
read, the law reviews are published primarily in order that they may be written."); David
Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods of American Legal Education 12 (Cleveland-Marshall Legal
Studies, Paper No. 11-205, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractjid=1773904 ("[I]t is rare for a legal academic's published output to be read by
more than a handful of other academics and it is also the case that those loyal readers tend
to be people who are already in agreement with the author."). Perhaps as a result, the paid
circulation of law reviews is in decline. See Joe Palazzolo, A Year in Law Review, WALL ST. J.,
March 5, 2012, at B4 (reporting that Harvard Law Review's paid circulation declined from
more than 10,000 in the 1960s and 1970s to 1,896 in 2011).
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but as person to person, or mind to mind."3 Richard Posner
acknowledged with some regret that "[I]aw professors used to
identify primarily with the legal profession and secondarily with
the university. The sequence has been reversed."4 A report of the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching noted,
"Like other professional schools, law schools are hybrid institu-
tions. One parent is the historic community of practitioners ....
The other heritage is that of the modern research university ....
[A]s American law schools have developed, their academic genes
have become dominant."5 The Carnegie Foundation Report also
noted that legal-academic scholarship has become "more like
scholarship in the arts-and-sciences disciplines."6 Jonathan Macey
described the same phenomenon in slightly different terms:
Something vaguely defined as "doctrinal analysis" traditionally
formed the core of legal scholarship. Over the years, this
changed as law schools tried to make their way up the hierar-
chical ladder from the status of trade schools to professional
schools and, finally, to the final rung of the academic ladder,
the status of full partner in the enterprise of the modern
American universities.
One manifestation of the shift from the profession to the acad-
emy is that more and more law professors have both a law degree
and a Ph.D. in an academic discipline such as economics, history,
literature, philosophy, political science, psychology, or sociology.
Some law professors have only a Ph.D. in one of these disciplines,
but no law degree. "In turn, the scholarship produced by America's
law schools is ever less oriented to the needs of the bar and the ju-
diciary."" Although most law students will practice in an area of
3. James Boyd White, Why I Write, 53 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1021, 1035 (1996).
4. Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914-2007), 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
435, 435 (2007).
5. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION OF LAw 4 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE FOUNDATION REPORT].
6. Id. at 7.
7. Jonathan R. Macey, Legal Scholarship: A Corporate Scholar's Perspective, 41 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1759, 1760 (2004). For an argument that law schools have not gone far enough in
this direction, see Barnhizer, supra note 2, passim.
8. JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 992 (2009) (citing Ed-
wards, supra note 2). See also Brent E. Newton, Law Review Scholarship in the Eyes of the Twenty-First
Century Supreme Court justices: An Empirical Analysis, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 399 (2012); Editorial,
Legal Education Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2011, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/opinion/legal-education-reform.html? -rl&hp; David
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private law, the law schools of today emphasize public law (primari-
ly federal law) and global law, relegating private law (primarily
state law, including my own area of trusts and estates) to second-
tier status. Law schools sometimes staff private-law courses with
adjuncts from practice.'
The shift from professional law school to law and humanities
school is partly due to the influence of a few elite law schools,'o
whose graduates dominate the law professoriate." These elite law
schools largely set the agenda for what type of scholarship is most
valued within the legal academic community. 2 In the words of a
study of this phenomenon, these law schools have become "intel-
lectual super-spreaders.""
My purpose, though, is not to insert myself into the debate
about the direction of law school teaching and scholarship. 4 My
purpose is to explain why I do law reform, not to cast aspersions on
those who do other things. Largely lost in the shift from profes-
sional law school to law-and-humanities school is the function of
the law professor as law reformer."1 Of those who explained why
9. See William L. Reynolds, Back to the Future in Law Schools, 70 MD. L. REV. 451, 461
(2011).
10. The move away from the professional law school, derisively called the trade-school
model by its critics, began with the legal realist movement (primarily associated with the
Columbia and Yale law faculties), followed by the critical legal studies movement (primarily
associated with the Harvard law faculty) and its counterweight, the law and economics
movement (primarily associated with the University of Chicago law faculty). See generally
LANGBEIN ET AL., supra note 8, at 982-92. Other movements occurring along the way in-
clude the critical race theory movement, the law and literature movement, the storytelling
movement, the hermeneutics movement, and the therapeutic jurisprudence movement. On
the last, see David B. Wexler, 7J Across the Law School Curriculum (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discus-
sion Paper No. 11-27, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1910742.
11. See CARNEGIE FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 5, at 89.
12. Id. at 89. ("The culture of legal education ... is shaped by the practices and
attitudes of the elite [law] schools; those practices and attitudes are reinforced through a
self-replicating circle of faculty and graduates."). Id. at 89. See also Segal, supra note 8.
13. See Daniel Martin Katz et al., Reproduction of Hierarchy? A Social Network Analysis of the
Amaerican Law Professoriate, 61 J. LEGAL Eouc. 76, 79 (2011). The authors, who are not mem-
bers of the American law professoriate, erroneously connected this phenomenon to
influencing the path of American law, when in fact it influences the path of American legal
scholarship.
14. The new law school at UC Irvine serves as a counter-trend example to the shift
from professional law school to law and humanities school. The Founding Dean, Erwin
Chemerinsky, set as his central vision for the new law school the preparation of students "for
the practice of law at the highest levels of the profession," a primary objective that "elite law
schools have long eschewed." See Enin Chemerinsky, The Ideal Lawo Schoolfor the 21st Century,
I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 13 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=1910049. Dean Chemerinsky also noted, though, and correctly in my view,
that interdisciplinary study is an integral part of fulfilling that central vision. See id. at 20.
15. At my own law school, judging from the questionnaire that each faculty member
must fill out and submit to the dean each year, testifying before a congressional committee is
729
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they write, only Yale Kamisar, who like me is now a member of the
older generation of law teachers, said that he usually writes profes-
sional to professional and does so to influence the law, or more
specifically, judicial decisions.1 6 But even Kamisar conceded-too
modestly in his case17-that although a law review article is not like-
ly to alter fundamental beliefs, "the right law review article can
have a significant impact on the courts when more 'incremental'
matters are at issue."'8 Similarly, Erwin Chemerinsky wrote:
Scholarship is, in a sense, an act of faith that writing can make
a difference. Yet, all of us know that the reality is that most of
what is written in law reviews is read by relatively few people
. ... Occasionally, there is an article . . . that dramatically
changes the way an area of the law is regarded and causes a
reform in the law. But such articles are rare. Perhaps more
common, a body of articles, over a period of time, causes a
change in the law. It is impossible to estimate what percentage
of legal scholarship has such an impact, but likely the number
is relatively small.'9
I experienced this phenomenon firsthand. I got into the busi-
ness of law reform after about sixteen years of law teaching. My
instinct had always been in a reformist direction, in both classroom
teaching and scholarship. I became increasingly frustrated by how
unresponsive to modern needs the law of trusts and estates had
become. Before getting into the law reform business, I authored
and coauthored law review articles that advocated reformso but
highly prized, but there is no interest in ascertaining whether the position advocated was
actually adopted and became law.
16. Yale Kamisar, Why I Write (And Why I Think Law Professors Generally Should Write), 41
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1747, 1747, 1754 (2004).
17. See Yale Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and Contemporaneous Incriminating State-
ments: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78. The Supreme
Court cited this article in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 & n.11 (1963), a deci-
sion reversing a former rule that Kamisar had argued was wrong. On this achievement,
Kamisar noted, "Of course, this is what many law professors live for." Kamisar, supra note 16,
at 1758 n.36.
18. Kamisar, supra note 16, at 1754 n.23.
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: Why Write?, 107 MICH. L. REv. 881, 893 (2009). For
an article that did have such an impact, see supra note 17.
20. E.g., John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced
Share, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggon-
er, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U.
PA. L. REv. 521 (1982); Lawrence W Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1718
(1983); Lawrence W Waggoner, Reformulating the Structure of Estates: A Proposal for Legislative
Action, 85 HARv. L. REV. 729 (1972); Lawrence W. Waggoner, A Proposed Alternative to the
Uniform Probate Code's Systemn for Intestate Distribution Among Descendants, 66 Nw. U. L. REV. 626
(1971).
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those articles did not move the law a whit. The articles did, howev-
er, get me selected as a reporter, first for the Uniform Law
Commission (ULC)2' and then for the American Law Institute
(ALI) . Only by becoming a reporter was I able to influence the
law." Although the work product of a reporter constitutes a form
of legal writing, it differs from the scholarship that has become
dominant among the law professoriate, which seldom makes an
imprint on the law. The work product of a reporter is directed at
duly constituted law-making authorities. In writing uniform stat-
utes, the reporter writes for legislatures. In writing Restatements,
the reporter writes for courts. In each case, the reporter also writes
for lawyers who have a case whose outcome might be controlled or
influenced by what the reporter has written.
WHERE WE STARTED, WHERE WE'VE GONE, AND
WHERE WE MIGHT Go IN THE FUTURE
During my professional lifetime, the law of trusts and estates has
developed in remarkable ways. When I started teaching in 1968,
perpetuity law followed the common-law Rule. Intestacy took no
account of the multiple-marriage society. The elective share of the
surviving spouse could easily be evaded by shifting assets to will
substitutes and, in any event, was not coordinated with the partner-
ship theory of marriage. The strict-compliance approach to will
21. My first role as a Reporter for the ULC was as a Reporter for the Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP), promulgated in 1986. Next, after being appointed as
Director of Research and then as Chief Reporter for the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform
Trust and Estate Acts, came a major overhaul of the substantive provisions of the Uniform
Probate Code (UPC), promulgated in 1990 and revised in part in 2008. Spinoffs from the
UPC revision project were the Uniform Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act (1991) and the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (1993).
22. I served in this latter capacity as the Reporter for the three-volume Restatement
(Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers, begun in 1990 and completed in
2011.
23. The proposals in the articles cited supra, note 20, are now adopted in either or
both the UPC and Restatement. On the spouse's forced share, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§§ 2-201 to -214 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. 1, at 101-32 (1998), 73-95 (Supp. 2011); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.2 (2003). On perpetuity
reform, see UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1986); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 (2011). On reformation of wills
on the ground of mistake, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2011) 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 181
(Supp. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 (2003). On reformulating the structure of estates, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS chs. 24 & 25 (2011). On the proposed al-
ternative to the Uniform Probate Code's system for intestate distribution among
descendants, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-106 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 85 (1998).
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execution was the norm." Wills could not be reformed, no matter
how clear the evidence of mistake. The revocation-on-divorce stat-
utes and the rules of construction only applied to wills and did not
extend to will substitutes. And the rules of construction could only
be rebutted by language in the will.
A lot has changed since. Both of the premier national law re-
form organizations-the ULC and the ALI-now have replaced all
of these outmoded rules with rules that hopefully are more at-
tuned to contemporary society. My own role has been mainly as
reporter for the ULC's Uniform Probate Code (UPC) and for the
ALI's Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative
Transfers." Being the reporter for both enabled me to try to make
the UPC and the Restatement consistent with one another. In
some cases, the UPC incorporated the reform first; in others, the
Restatement did. To pick out just a couple of examples, the Re-
statement led on the reformation of wills and on the treatment of
children of assisted reproduction; the UPC caught up later. The
UPC led on extending the rules of construction and the revoca-
tion-on-divorce statutes to will substitutes; the Restatement caught
up later." The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities
24. Largely because of the participation of John Langbein as a member of the Joint
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts, the UPC replaced the strict-compliance
approach with the harmless-error rule. SeeUNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (1990), 8 U.L.A. pt.
1, at 108 (Supp. 2011), later adopted in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 'ILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (1999). Langbein had previously published an article advocating
a substantial-compliance doctrine. SeeJohn H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975). But he later changed his mind, based on the disappoint-
ing judicial experience with the substantial compliance doctrine in the Australian state of
South Australia, and advocated the harmless error rule instead. SeeJohn H. Langbein, Excus-
ing Harmless Errors in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate
Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1987). For application of the UPC's harmless error rule, see Es-
tate of Stoker, 193 Cal. App. 4th 236 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (signed but unwitnessed will
upheld under California's enactment of UPC's harmless error rule); Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d
1134 (Mont. 2002) (signed but unwitnessed will upheld under Montana's enactment of
UPC's harmless error rule).
25. 1 also served in an advisory role for the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts.
26. On reformation of wills, see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (2011) 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at
181 (Supp. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANS-
FERS § 12.1 (2003); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Curing Execution Errors and
Mistaken Terms in Wills (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 207, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653438. On the treatment of children of assisted reproduction,
see UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 141-42 (Supp. 2011); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: W'ILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 14.8-.9 (2011);
Sheldon F. Kurtz & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC Addresses the Class-Gift and Intestacy
Rights of Children ofAssisted Reproduction Technologies, 35 ACTECJ. 30 (2009).
27. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-701 to -711, -804 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 181-205
(1998), 141-69, 177-79 (Supp. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS §4.1 (b) (1999); ch. 14 (2011).
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(USRAP), later incorporated into the UPC, led on perpetuity re-
form; the Restatement caught up later and, I hope, improved on
the USRAP/UPC version."
In some cases, when the UPC adopted specific rules whose im-
plementation seemed beyond the power of the courts and
achievable only by statute, I did not think that the Restatement
could follow suit, even though I favored the UPC position on the
merits. The usual approach I took in those cases was to describe
the UPC approach, either in the Restatement black letter provi-
sions or commentary or, in some cases, in the Reporter's Note. The
UPC's 120-hour requirement of survival is one example.' Another
is the UPC's elective-share schedule." Still another is the UPC's
requirement that a child of assisted reproduction who is conceived
28. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-901 to -906 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 226-39 (1998)
(incorporating the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities into the UPC); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 27.1-.3 (2011);
Lawrence W. Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes a New Approach to Perpetuities:
Limiting the Dead Hand to Two Younger Generations (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper
No. 200, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1614936.
On the perpetual-trust movement, see Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST
Exemption for Perpetual Trusts, 135 Tax Notes 1267 (June 4, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2083804; Lawrence W. Waggoner, US Perpetual Trusts, 127 LAW Q.
REV. 422 (2011); Lawrence W. Waggoner, From Here to Eternity: The Folly of Perpetual Trusts (Univ.
of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 259, 2011, updated 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975117; Lawrence W Waggoner, Curtailing Dead-Hand Control: The
American Law Institute Declares the Perpetual-Trust Movement Ill Advised (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law
Working Paper No. 199, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/absu-act=1614934; Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Message to Congress: Halt the Tax Exemption for Perpetual Trusts (Univ. of Mich. Pub.
Law Working Paper No. 206, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652791. A slightly
shortened, less documented, and lightly edited version of this essay appears as Commentary,
Message to Congress: Halt the Tax Exemption for Perpetual Trusts, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRES-
SIONs 23 (2010), available at http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/109/waggoner.pdf
See also RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN
DEAD 76-85 (2010); Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEx. L.
REv. 1149, 1156-65 (2011) (reviewing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW (2009) and describing, at 1160, the per-
petual-trust movement as "loony"); Ray D. Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES,July
12, 2010, at A19; Lawrence W Waggoner, Congress Should Impose a Two-Generation Limit on the
GSTExemption: Here's Why (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 205, 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1640742;Jane Bryant Quinn, Estate Taxes: Why Congress Needs to Plug
the Loophole That Builds Up Dynastic Wealth, CBSMONEYWATCH.COM (Dec. 1, 2010), http://
moneywatch.bnet.com/inivesting/blog/make-money/estate-taxes-why-congress-needs-to-plug-
the-loophole-that-builds-up-dynastic-wealth/676/?tag-coll;fd-banner-news; Robert Sitkoff,
Top-Doun Versus Bottom-Up Law Reform in Trusts and Estates: Future Interests and Perpetuities,
JOTWELL TRUSTS AND ESTATES (Nov. 22, 2010), http://trustestjotwell.com/top-down-versus-
bottom-up-law-reform-in-trusts-and-estates-future-interests-and-perpetuiies.
29. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, -702 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 182-84 (1998), 42
(Supp. 2011); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 1.2 cmts. d & e (1999).
30. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 74-75 (Supp. 2011); RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.2 (2003).
SUMMER 2012] 733
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posthumously must be born within forty-five months of the
deceased parent's death (or in utero within thirty-six months of the
deceased parent's death) if the distribution date arises at the de-
ceased parent's death.3 ' A third example is the UPC's substitution
of the descendants of a beneficiary of a future interest if the bene-
ficiary fails to survive the time of possession.2 Describing the UPC
position in this manner is designed to bring that position to the
attention of a court dealing with the issue without presenting it as
the official Restatement position. Presenting it as the official Re-
statement position would risk outright rejection by a court, while
describing the UPC position opens up the possibility that a more
adventurous court might adopt it.
What's in store for the future? The ULC now has two projects in
motion: a uniform act on premarital and marital agreements, and
one on powers of appointment." Although, as a retiree, I am not
directly involved in either project, the Restatement has already ad-
dressed both topics," and may influence or serve as the model for
the uniform acts. On the possible agenda for the future is a uni-
form act on the simplification of the doctrine of estates and on
perpetuities, again using the Restatement as the model. 3 5
No uniform act or Restatement is the sole product of the re-
porter. Many others contribute to the final product. Unlike the
work of academic authors of student-edited law journal articles,
leading specialist and non-specialist practitioners, judges, and aca-
demics vet the work of the reporter for both organizations many
times over before the work sees the light of day as a final product.36
31. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(g) (2) (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 142 (Supp. 2011);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WVILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 14.8-.9
(2011).
32. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-707 (2011), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 155-57 (Supp. 2011);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 'ILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §§ 15.4 cmt. i,
26.3 cmt. h (2011).
33. Both projects are in good hands. For the makeup of the drafting committee on
premarital and marital agreements, see Committees: Premarital and Marital Agreements, UNIF. L.
COMM'N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Premarital%20and%20Marital
%20Agreements (last visited Jul. 23, 2012), and for the makeup of the drafting committee
on powers of appointment, see http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Powers
%20of%2OAppointment (last visitedJul. 23, 2012).
34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.4
(2003) (premarital and marital agreements); §§ 17.1-23.1 (2011) (powers of appointment).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS chs. 24,
25, and 27 (2011). See also Lawrence 'W Waggoner, The American Law Institute Proposes Simpli-
fing the Doctrine of Estates (Univ. of Mich. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 198, 2010), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1612878.
36. The Restatement is vetted by the Advisers, Consultative Group Members, ALI
Council, and the full ALI membership. See Drafting Cycle, A.L.I., http://www.ali.org
/index.cfm?ftseaction=projects.drafting (last visited Mar. 11, 2012). The Uniform Probate
Code is drafted by the Drafting Committee, vetted by the joint Editorial Board for Uniform
734 [VOL. 45:4
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The ultimate vetting comes post-promulgation. No uniform act
or Restatement automatically becomes law.3' A uniform law in
trusts and estates usually has to be vetted first by the relevant sec-
tion of the state bar, and then, if approved, introduced and
enacted by the state legislature. The UPC itself has a greater obsta-
cle to overcome than the Uniform Trust Code (UTC), because all
of the states already have a probate code, whereas, in the pre-UTC
world, only a couple of states had codified trust law. Filling a vacu-
um is always easier than replacing law with which lawyers and
judges are already familiar. In any event, I have always viewed the
UPC as aspirational.
Whether a Restatement becomes law depends on whether it's
cited by one of the parties to a lawsuit and then embraced in a
published opinion by the state court. Much work still needs to be
done here. Enactment of the UPC is far from universal, and the
Restatement, being fairly new, has penetrated the law of only a
few states. Still, on occasion, the UPC has influenced the law in
states that have not enacted it. For example, Will of Ranney adopt-
ed the UPC position (UPC § 2-503) that a will is treated as if it
had been validly executed despite a minor defect in execution. 8
Another example is Ruotolo v. Tietjen, which adopted the UPC
Trust and Estate Acts, and then vetted by the full ULC membership. See ULC Drafting Process,
UNIF. L. COMNI'N, http://www.nccusl.org/Narrative.aspx?title=ULC%20Drafting%20Process
(last visited Mar. 11, 2012).
Of course, nothing is perfect, and there are parts of both projects that might have been
done differently or better. There also have been articles by legal academics criticizing the
approach of one or more sections. Sometimes the author's argument resonated with the
Committee; in those cases, the Committee attempted to correct the oversight. See, e.g., Ira
Mark Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the Surviving Spouse Under the
Redesigned Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and Suggestions, 55 ALB. I.. REv. 941, 975-77
(1992) (arguing against the provision that charges the surviving spouse with amounts that
would have passed to the surviving spouse but were disclaimed; in response, the ULC delet-
ed the provision in 1993).
37. The Virgin Islands, an exception, provides:
The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the law approved
by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not so expressed, as generally un-
derstood and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts
of the Virgin Islands in cases to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to the
contrary.
V.I. CODE ANN., tit. 1, § 4 (1995). The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands has
enacted a similar statute. See 7 N. MAR. 1. CODE § 3401 (2004).
38. Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1343-44 (N.J. 1991). New Jersey subsequently en-
acted UPC § 2-503. See 2004 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 132 (West 2007) (codified at N.J. SrAr.
ANN. § 3B:3-3). Compare Estate of Iversen, 150 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (refus-
ing to recognize the harmless error rule judicially), with Sisson v. Park St. Baptist Church, 24
E.T.R.2d 18, 18-22 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1998) (adopting the harmless error rule judicially).
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position (UPC § 2-603(b) (3)) that survival language does not au-
tomatically trump an antilapse statute."
CONCLUSION
Because my work on the Restatement is completed and I have
become the Emeritus Director of Research in the Joint Editorial
Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts, I probably should have
entitled this short Article, "Why I Did Law Reform." But I like the
title as it is, and am sticking with it. Nevertheless, the Article is
somewhat of a personal retrospective, so I will now slip into the
past tense.
Why did I devote such a large portion of my career to law re-
form? I certainly did not do it for personal recognition. Law
reformers are relatively anonymous, even within legal circles. No
state enacting a uniform law names the reporter for that uniform
law, not even in the bill's preamble. No court adopting the position
of a Restatement identifies the Restatement's reporter.40 Here are
some quotes from judicial opinions in which the Property Re-
statement influenced the court's decision to make new law:4 1 "We
adopt the view of the American Law Institute on this issue" (Iowa
Supreme Court) ;42 "In sum, we agree with [the Restatement and
UPC]" (Connecticut Appellate and Supreme Courts) ;43 "We adopt
39. Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166, 177 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), aff'd per curiam, 916
A.2d I (Conn. 2007).
40. In one case, however, in which the court rejected the Restatement view, I was iden-
tified as "[t]he member presenting the proposed new section." Bongaards v. Millen, 793
N.E.2d 335, 351 n.20 (Mass. 2003).
By contrast, the courts in several cases mentioned my name in connection with a uniform
law for which I was the reporter, usually by citing an article I wrote about the statute. See, e.g.,
Stillman v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Assoc. College Ret. Equities Fund, 343 F.3d 1311, 1319
(10th Cir. 2003); American Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Jenson, Civ. No. 11-5057-JLV, 2012 WL
848158, (D. S.D. 2012); Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 E Supp. 1012, 1019 (E.D. Wis.
2002); In re Estate of Maldonado, 117 P.3d 720, 723 n.16 (Alaska 2005); UNUM Life Ins. Co.
v. Craig, 28 P.3d 510, 514 (Ariz. 2001); Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166, 177 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006), aff'd per curiam, 916 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2007); In re Estate of Sprenkle-Hill, 703 N.W.2d
191, 196 n.25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005); In re Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339, 1344 (N.J. 1991);
In re Estate of Deoneseus, 906 P.2d 922, 923 (Wash. 1995).
41. Many other decisions cite the Restatement in support of existing law. The quota-
tions above are limited to cases in which the court cited the Restatement in support of
making new law.
42. Sieh v. Sieh, 713 N.W2d 194, 198 (Iowa 2006) (adopting the Restatement position
that a revocable trust created before the marriage is subject to the forced share of the surviv-
ing spouse, even when the forced share statute refers only to the probate estate).
43. Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166, 177 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), affd per curiam, 916
A.2d I (Conn. 2007) (adopting the Restatement position that mere survival language does
not trump an antilapse statute).
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the Restatement view on this subject" (Indiana Supreme Court);'
"We agree with [the Restatement] and [other] authorities that the
latent/patent distinction ... no longer serves any useful purpose"
(Indiana Supreme Court) ;45 "The rationale of the Restatement ...
should be applied here..." (New York Surrogate Court);46 "[I] t
seems logical to this court to choose the path ... recommended by
the Restatement . . ." (another New York Surrogate Court);47 "On
the basis of [the Restatement and other] authorities, we conclude
that while [the Michigan statute on no-contest clauses] does not
apply to trusts, it reflects the state's public policy that no-contest
clauses in trust agreements are unenforceable if there is probable
cause for challenging the trust" (Michigan Court of Appeals) ;48 "We
follow the Restatement ... on this point, for the reasons ex-
plained" (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court) .4
Anonymity continues in the casebooks. Although all of the lead-
ing trust and estate casebooks cite, quote, or discuss the UPC, the
Restatement, or both on just about every issue, the reporter's name
is almost never mentioned."o Whether the reporter is anonymous
or not, however, is beside the point: the point is that the work has
consequences.
So, again, why did I do it? The answer is pretty simple. I did it for
my own self-satisfaction in hoping that my work made a difference
for the good and because I liked doing it. I liked the process, from
thinking about how the law can be improved, to writing the drafts,
to meeting with the oversight committees composed of leading
44. Carlson v. Sweeney, Dabagia, Donoghue, ThorneJanes & Pagos, 895 N.E.2d 1191,
1200 (Ind. 2008) (adopting, in a tax reformation case, the Restatement position that a mis-
take of law as well as of fact can be the basis for reforming a testamentary trust). The court
also cited Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake, supra note 20.
See Carlson, 895 N.E.2d at 1200.
45. Univ. of S. Ind. Found. v. Baker, 843 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind. 2006).
46. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 211 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007).
47. In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.YS.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2002) (adopting the po-
sition that a will can be reformed on the ground of mistake).
48. In re Griffin Revocable Grantor Trust, 760 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
Later in the opinion, the court adopted the Restatement's definition of probable cause. Id.
at 323.
49. In re Estate of Beauregard, 921 N.E.2d 954, 958 n.5 (Mass. 2010) (adopting the Re-
statement position that preponderance of the evidence, not clear and convincing evidence,
is the proper standard of proof for rebutting the presumption that a lost will that is traced to
the testator's possession was revoked by act).
50. There is one case known to me that did mention my name, by citing a law review
article that Ed Halbach and I coauthored (Edward C. HalbachJr. & Lawrence W Waggoner,
The UPC's New Survivorship and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REv. 1091 (1992)). The case is
Ruotolo v. Tietjen, 890 A.2d 166, 170 & n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006), aff'd per curiam, 916 A.2d
1 (Conn. 2007). The casebooks reproduce the case as a principal case, but the casebook
editors edited out the citation! See, e.g., THOMAS P. GALLANIS, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 280-85 (5th ed. 2011).
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trust and estate academics, practitioners, and judges, to presenting
the drafts to the full membership of the ULC or ALI, and finally to
seeing the final product enacted by a state legislature or embraced
by a court. Overriding all the other reasons, though, is the hope
that the work has improved the law." If it has, great, because in one
way or another-as survivor, heir, beneficiary, settlor, testator, or
intestate-the law of trusts and estates touches just about everyone.
51. One feature of the UPC in which I take some pride is that there has been very little
appellate litigation requiring interpretation of the statutory language.
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